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1. Background 
 
It is widely accepted that one of the principal objectives of government expenditure 
on health care is to generate health. Since health is a function of both length of life 
and quality of life, the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) has been developed in an 
attempt to combine the value of these two into a single index number (Dolan, 2000). 
QALYs are increasingly being used in the evaluation of health care interventions and 
have been recommended by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) for use in cost-effectiveness analyses of health technologies (www.nice.org). 
 
There are, however, many concerns about the appropriateness of using QALYs to 
inform resource allocation decisions. These relate to issues about the extent to which 
QALYs adequately capture the individual benefits and social value from health care 
interventions. In what follows, we will assume that QALYs are an appropriate 
currency in which to express individual health benefits. At the social level, the de 
facto standard in economic evaluations is that “a QALY is a QALY is a QALY” i.e. 
that a given health benefit is valued equally regardless of who gets it. However, there 
is now growing evidence that this assumption is not a good representation of societal 
preferences (Dolan et al, 2005), and yet the evidence does not allow us to estimate 
equity weights for QALYs. This is the purpose of the present project. 
 
Our specific goal is to elicit preferences from members of the general public that can 
be fed into a social welfare function (SWF), which allows us to estimate the weight 
given to the health of one population group relative to another. Most of the studies in 
this area have adopted a social perspective, in which respondents are asked to 
consider allocation decisions that they personally may not be affected by. We propose 
to do the same. Standard economic theory is concerned with the optimising behaviour 
of self-interested individuals, and so many economists are rather distrustful of 
preferences that contain no self-interest at all. However, although self-interest exists, it 
does not necessarily follow that it must – or should – be the basis for social welfare 
evaluation (Menzel, 1999; Dolan et al, 2003).  
 
Before we could elicit equity weights, we needed, first, to determine the relevant 
attributes and levels over which to elicit preferences and, second, to develop methods 
which facilitate the elicitation of stable preferences. The next two sections deal very 
briefly with these two initial phases of the project. Section 3 discusses the general 
design and analysis issues in generating equity weights in the form a SWF. Section 4 
presents the questionnaire format and specific questions for the main and additional 
studies, the analyses of these questions and the respondents in our main studies. 
Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 discusses some of the methodological 
and policy issues that these results raise. 
 
2. What to elicit preferences over and how to elicit them  
 
Phase 1 of the project consisted of four studies. Studies A and B used focus groups 
with members of the general public to identify the relevant attributes and to identify 
meaningful levels of these attributes, respectively. Study A was a qualitative study 
involving 15 members of the public in group sessions. The attributes presented for 
consideration were: age, social class, length of time with condition, dependents, 
quality of life without treatment, and whether the condition was caused by NHS 
 3 
negligence. All of these attributes were considered relevant in Study A in that 
respondents chose to depart from simple QALY maximisation in order to take them 
into account. Study B asked 42 individuals (across two rounds) to trade-off attributes 
against QALY gains.  The study varied the number of QALYs that would have to be 
sacrificed to target a priority group (100 QALYs across 1000 individuals versus 500 
QALYs across 1000 individuals). A smaller proportion of respondents were ready to 
diverge from QALY maximisation where the cost of doing so was larger.  
 
Attributes and levels for which respondents were willing to sacrifice health gains 
across both levels of QALY sacrifice included: quality of life without treatment (when 
the lower level was 40%); time with condition (where one party had the condition for 
one year or more); and age (15-24 year-olds relative to 65-74 year-olds; and under-5s 
relative to 25-34 year-olds). Finally, Study C aimed to identify the most policy 
relevant combinations of attributes from a postal survey of NHS staff (n=172). The 
modal result across all attributes was that the attribute is relevant to NHS policy 
“depending on what else is known”, and no attribute was regarded by a majority as 
relevant to NHS policy “no matter what”. The three attributes where the majority of 
respondents thought the attribute in question “would be relevant depending on what 
else is known” were: quality of life without treatment (40% as opposed to 70%); 
length of time with condition (more than one year as opposed to recent); and age (5-
25 as opposed to 60-80). The next most important attribute, but not a majority view, 
was NHS negligence.  
 
Studies A to C identified three attributes for taking forward into later phases of the 
project: age, quality of life without treatment, and responsibility. Age was clearly 
important but there was no real consensus about when age mattered for policy and 
when it did not – except in the case of children versus adults. This is the focus of our 
comparisons. For quality of life without treatment, a value of 25% was chosen for 
comparison with full health. We can be confident that 25% health meets the threshold 
for the general public to treat quality of life as significantly lower than full (100%) 
health. In terms of responsibility, NHS negligence appears to be somewhat important. 
Since it seems unrealistic to contrast NHS responsibility with all other causes of ill 
health, or with 100% patient responsibility, it was decided to present this attribute as 
three categories: NHS responsibility and no patient responsibility; no NHS 
responsibility and limited patient responsibility; and no NHS responsibility and no 
patient responsibility. 
 
Study D explored preferences relating to the concentration and dispersion of benefits 
across beneficiaries who are equal in all relevant aspects. Whilst people may prefer to 
spread out health benefits to a larger number of patients than to concentrate on a 
smaller number if the benefit per person is large enough, they may also prefer to 
concentrate than to disperse if the benefits per person from dispersion are below a 
certain threshold. From 68 respondents surveyed in group meetings, 2.6 years was 
identified as the threshold or ‘tipping point’. This finding is used to guide the design 
of trade-off exercises used in the remainder of the project i.e. we make sure that the 
difference between two groups in any one scenario is at least 2.6 years. 
 
Once the attributes and levels had been decided upon, Phase 2 of the project surveyed 
members of the public using two different designs to determine which of them was 
more conducive towards eliciting stable preferences. The “resource intensive” (RI) 
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design involved a group discussion with fellow participants prior to an individual, 
face-to-face interview, whereas the “interview only” (IO) design did not involve the 
group discussion stage. The objective of Phase 2 was to identify the impact on 
peoples’ preferences of the group discussion, and of the opportunity to deliberate over 
the issues between this group discussion and the individual interview. The stability of 
preferences was captured by administering a series of attitudinal questions on 
resource prioritisation at multiple time points in the study design. There were 56 
respondents in the RI design and 232 for the IO design.  
 
The results suggest that design appears to have had no significant effect on the 
willingness to prioritise different groups. Deliberation does have an effect on general 
prioritisation preferences, but this appears to be limited to the different stages within 
the RI design rather than between the two designs. However, given the sample size, 
and the different distributions of background characteristics across the two sub-
samples of this study, the interpretation of this is not quite so straightforward. At a 
practical level, the IO design proved to be far more straightforward in terms of 
recruiting respondents and it was much less costly. Since the prior elicitation of 
beliefs and attitudes appear to be more important in generating stable preferences than 
discussion groups, we use the IO design in the main elicitation phase of the project. 
 
3. General design and analysis issues 
 
Four important considerations are addressed here. First, the ways in which the trade-
offs are to be specified: we favour a SWF approach. Second, what precisely the trade-
offs are to be over (the ‘distribuendum’ as Dolan and Olsen, 2001, call it): we favour 
weightings over lifetime health. Third, the kinds of questions that follow from these 
first two considerations. Fourth, the method of analysis used to parameterise the SWF. 
 
3.1 The trade-off (social welfare) function 
  
In economics, the SWF is typically assumed to be a function of individual utilities, 
which are then weighted within the function to provide a trade-off in the utilities 
received by different beneficiaries (Layard and Walters, 1994). Several studies have 
used a SWF in the area of health economics to model preferences and balance the 
competing demands of efficiency and equity (Dolan 1998, Dolan and Robinson, 2001, 
Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2004). In health contexts, non-health outcomes for an 
individual are often disregarded and the focus is instead on health rather than utilities 
(Dolan, 1998). 
  
Several functional forms have been suggested for the SWF, and these typically 
involve some form of concavity conferring value to a more even distribution of 
outcomes. Prominent amongst these has been the constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES; Dolan, 1988; Lindholm and Rosen, 1998) in which the health of two equal 
sized groups is assessed: 
 W = ( )[ ] rrr vv 121 1 --- -+ aa ,  0\),1[],1,0[ ¥-ÎÎ ra  
 
where:  vX is the lifetime health of Group X, 
  a is the weight placed on the health of Group 1, 
and   r reflects the overall strength of inequality aversion. 
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The objective of the empirical study is to identify the inequality aversion parameter 
(r) and the relative weight (a), so that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) for 
specific combinations of health between the two groups can be calculated. The MRS 
in this context represents the relative social value of a marginal change in the social 
value of health to one group relative to the other, keeping the total level of social 
welfare constant. If the MRS is 1.5, that means that if the health of Group 1 
deteriorates by 1 unit, then the health of Group 2 will need to improve by 1.5 units in 
order to maintain the current level of social welfare. This will then suggest that the 
marginal social value of the health of group 1 is 1.5 times that of group 2, indicating 
the relative values to be used in resource allocation decisions. 
 
Through the r parameter, the CES SWF can represent a variety of different attitudes 
towards relative inequalities, and hence also iso-welfare contours.  All these contours 
are homothetic, so that the trade-offs between different factors (the MRS) are 
unaffected by proportional increases in all variables. In other words, homotheticity 
implies that the value of inequality reduction is expected to differ according to the 
relative difference between v1 and v2. For r = -1 and 5.0=a , the function is a simple 
sum of the lifetime health of the two groups and no value is given to reducing 
inequality.  And as r rises, increasing value is given to equity.  At the extreme, as r 
approaches infinity, only the group whose lifetime health is perceived to be worse is 
given any importance. The a parameter allows for the groups to be weighted 
differently aside from any health differences between them. The trade-off between the 
health of both groups (the MRS) is given by a/(1 – a) along the 450 line. 
 
In a case where there are no differences to base an unequal relative weight on, then 
5.0=a  and social welfare is a function of only one parameter (r) for inequality 
aversion. As we shall see more fully in Section 3.2 below, “lifetime health 
judgements” (which represent the social value attached to profiles of health over a 
lifetime) can be written as a function of two parameters, and so as few as three sets of 
pairs of indifference points are sufficient to find a social welfare function covering 
efficiency and inequality with an additional pair of indifference points necessary to 
find each weight for non-health characteristics. In practice, we can use more than this 
in order to have more confidence in the results. Of the three main attributes 
considered in the study, timing and severity of ill-health are interpreted as part of the 
definition of lifetime health judgements, and its effects are reflected in r. Condition 
cause/responsibility is considered a non-health characteristic and its effects are 
reflected in a.  
 
3.2 The trade-off (lifetime health) space  
 
Consistent with most of the work in this area, and in keeping with the design of our 
studies in Phase 1, ‘equity weights’ refer to any conscious departure from the 
assumption that all QALYs should be weighted equally. There is an issue, however, 
about whether we start with all QALY gains (i.e. the benefits from treatment) as being 
equally weighted or whether we consider final outcomes, which combine starting 
point and gains (Dolan and Olsen, 2001).  Whilst it is possible to frame the questions 
in either way, the final outcomes space takes account of potentially relevant additional 
information e.g. in relation to overall health. It might be possible to break down the 
final outcomes into current position and gains but this would require yet more 
 6 
information for respondents to process. Since there is evidence that the greater the 
number of attributes presented simultaneously, the more likely individuals are to 
employ heuristics or shortcuts in making decisions (Payne et al, 1988; Lloyd 2003) 
rather than a substantive evaluation of the question. 
 
When gains have arguably been the most salient consideration in the framing of the 
questions, there is some support for the notion that respondents are focussing on the 
final outcomes. If we consider the gains-space, then preferences should satisfy the 
Pareto Principle; that is, we should prefer to give benefits to one group if it does not 
imply a loss to the other group. However, we have found that up to 20% of 
respondents violate this basic principle (Dolan et al, 2002). This implies a backwards 
bending SWF (Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2004) and it also provides evidence in support 
of a focus on final outcomes (which in these questions is more equal when the Pareto 
Principle is violated). Not violating the Principle may still be indicative of a focus on 
outcomes but without such a strong preference for reducing overall inequalities 
(Tsuchiya and Dolan, 2008). In any event, the use of gains is also problematic in that 
it requires the identification of a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
 
The choice of outcome space as opposed to the gains space is also associated with the 
use of lifetime health experience as the relevant distribuendum. It is possible to 
discuss priority and equity in health care resource allocation based only on the current 
health of patients, with no reference to the lifetime health of these patients. For 
example, one may argue that if the cost-effectiveness of treatment is the same, 
patients who are currently suffering in severe health should be given higher priority 
over those patients who are only suffering a mild health problem. However, it may be 
the case that this severe suffering is only for a very brief duration, whereas the mild 
suffering is to last much longer; and if so, it is not obvious that the former patients 
should always get priority over the latter patients. 
 
In the simplest case, we could treat the social value of lifetime health as equal to the 
number of QALYs the person will live. The QALY gives no explicit weight to health 
at different life stages, as it is formed using only quality of life and duration. In 
contrast, societal weights may lead to different conclusions. We define a generalised 
QALY measure using attributes for childhood versus adult health and severe versus 
good health states (from Phase 1). 
 
We use a functional form for iv  that equals: 
å
¥
=
=
1
),(
t
iti thVv , 
where V  is a weighting function based on health-related quality of life ( ith ) of group 
i at time t and timing ( t ) that increases in health ( 0>
itdh
dV ). If iv  is multiplicatively 
separable into health and timing components then: 
å
¥
=
=
1
)()(
t
iti tThxv ,   0>
itdh
dx , 0)( >tT . 
 
Within the study, we used a dichotomous variable for timing representing whether 
health is experienced up to or after 18 years of age, and quality of life at 0.25 (or 25% 
health) and 1.00 (100% health). A quality of life level at 0.00 (0% health, or dead) is 
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also used for computational reasons, although this is not valued. In contrast, the 
QALY takes the form ithå  and thus includes no timing dimension or social weights. 
Expanding iv  we can write: 
,DASHAFHADCSHCFHCi yDAySHAyFHAyDCySHCyFHCv ×+×+×+×+×+×=  (Eq. 1) 
where: 
· FHC is the value of a year in full health whilst aged < 18, 
· SHC is the value of a year in 25% health whilst aged < 18, 
· DC is the value of being dead whilst aged < 18, 
· FHA is the value of a year in full health whilst aged ≥ 18, 
· SHA is the value of a year in 25% health whilst aged ≥ 18, and 
· DA is the value of being dead whilst dead aged ≥ 18, 
and the XXXy variables give the number of years spent in each health/time 
combination. For comparability with the QALY, FHA = 1 and DA = 0. If we can also 
say that health and timing are multiplicatively separable then: 
 .)( SHCSHAFHCFHAi ySHAFHCySHAyFHCyv ×´+×+×+=  (Eq.2) 
 
As an example, consider the case where the following two ‘states’ of affairs are 
regarded as equally good in terms of social welfare: In the first state, Groups 1 and 2 
both experience 60 years of full health; in the second state, Group 1 experiences 65 
years of full health, and Group 2 experiences 56 years of full health. Here, let us 
assume that a = 0.5. Suppose, initially, that the value of health during childhood 
equals the value of health during adulthood (FHC=FHA=1), so that v1=v2=60 in the 
first state and v1 = 65, v2 = 56 in the second state. Here,  
[ ] [ ] rr rrrr 11 )56(5.0)65(5.0)60(5.0)60(5.0 ------ ×+×=×+× . 
Solving this numerically we find r = 2.00. 
 
Suppose instead that the value of health during childhood is twice as high as the value 
of health during adulthood (FHC =2), so that now in the first state v1=v2=78 (since the 
first 18 years receive twice the weight of adult years) and v1 = 83, v2 = 74 in the 
second. Here, 
[ ] [ ] rr rrrr 11 )74(5.0)83(5.0)78(5.0)78(5.0 ------ ×+×=×+× . 
Solving this numerically we find r = 2.89. This illustrates how the parameters 
defining lifetime health judgements and inequality aversion are not independent from 
each other. Any observed level of aversion to in equality at the societal level is due to 
a combination of both the difference in lifetime health judgements and the 
significance of this difference to society.  
 
Therefore, the inequality aversion parameter cannot be identified unless we know how 
big health differences are, their relative size, and the trade-offs society would make. 
Equally, as the preferences we observe are influenced by both inequality aversion and 
judgements about the value of health received, we cannot assess the size of the 
parameter defining FHC without knowing inequality aversion. We are, however, able 
to estimate these together. 
 
In relation to the effect of non-health characteristics, consider the case where society 
is indifferent between the following states: In the first state, Groups 1 and 2 both 
experience 66 years of full health; in the second state, Group 1 experiences 60 years 
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of full health, and Group 2 experiences 75 years of full health. If all years of full 
health receive the same weighting, then this suggests r = 2.65. If the health of Group 1 
deteriorates by six years and the health of Group 2 improves by nine years, then it 
follows from that SWF that the level of social welfare will remain unchanged. 
Suppose that after personal responsibility characteristics are added into questions the 
second state needs to be changed to 62 years of full health to Group 1, and 75 years of 
full health to Group 2 in order to achieve indifference between the two states. Society 
is now willing to give up only four years of Group 1’s health in order to get nine years 
of Group 2’s health. Group 1’s health is therefore given a greater value than before. In 
other words, a nine-year improvement to the health of Group 2 will now only make up 
for a four-year deterioration to the health of Group 1 as opposed to six, so the health 
of Group 1 is now given a greater value than before. 
 
Here, adding personal responsibility characteristics have led to increased value on the 
health of Group 1; the best-fit a increases to 0.614 (versus 0.50 previously) since: 
[ ] [ ] 65.2165.21 65.265.265.265.2 )75(386.0)62(614.0)66(386.0)66(614.0 ------ ×+×=×+×  
The inequality aversion parameter (r) does not influence preferences where the health 
of both groups is equal. The relative weight a is the marginal value of an 
improvement to the health of Group 1 relative to an improvement to the health of 
Group 2 where health is equal (0.614/0.386 = 1.59). 
 
3.3 Finding states with equal social welfare 
 
Our general approach is motivated around identifying pairs of states with the same 
level of social welfare attached to them, where each state represents a different 
combination of lifetime health to two population groups. In order to find these states, 
our questions could use different methods. Our preferred method is a simple pairwise 
task that asks respondents which of a pair of states they prefer and may also allow for 
indifference.  
 
Given the use of pairwise data, we need to be able to identify pairs of equally good 
states from a societal point of view. We do this by asking series of choices that 
compare the same state (“study state”) against a series of four “reference states”. For 
each study state we have a “Choice Set” of four independent choices. Within each 
Choice Set, we aggregate preferences to find a sixth point that has the same social 
welfare as the study state. In Figure 1, where the axes represent the health of Groups 1 
and 2 respectively, reference states are labelled as x1 to x4, the study state is labelled 
as x5. 
 
The reference states are constructed so that, when graphed, it is possible to draw a 
straight line through all four states. Since health is higher for both groups in 1x  than 
in 4x , it is reasonable to assume that individuals will prefer 1x . In the same way, 1x  
is preferred to 2x , 2x  is preferred to 3x , and 3x  is preferred to 4x . This is 
represented as: 4321 xxxx fff . Suppose that (as in the example above) an 
individual prefers the study state ( 5x ) over the worst two reference states ( 3x  and 4x ) 
but prefers the best two reference states ( 1x  and 2x ) to the study state. For such an 
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individual, 43521 xxxxx ffff . This tells us where 5x  lies in the order of 1x  to 4x  
for that individual.  
 
Figure 1: Reference and study states. 
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In practice individuals make errors when making choices and might, for instance, 
indicate that they prefer 5x  to 3x  when the opposite is the case. This would mean that 
we might form the wrong preference ordering based on their individual data.  In other 
cases, errors may prevent us from finding a preference ordering at all. For example, if 
an individual states that 25 xx f  and 35 xx f  then this suggests that 23 xx f , but we 
know that 23 xx p . In this case, we cannot form a coherent ordering between the 
individuals, and the assumption of transitivity is violated. 
 
Whilst preferences at an individual level are “noisy”, we would expect these sorts of 
errors to balance out at an aggregate level.  For this reason, we focus on preferences 
from all individuals together. That is, instead of finding where 5x  falls in a preference 
ordering for each individual, we instead consider where it falls in an overall ordering.  
We know that one reference state ( 4x ) is the worst state and has the lowest value 
amongst the four reference states and, as we move towards the best of the states ( 1x ), 
social welfare increases. The aim of the analysis is to find a point along this 
progression that has the same social welfare as the study state, which can then be 
called the “equivalent state”. The equivalent state is labelled 6x  (see Figure 1 above). 
The pair of the “study state” and the “equivalent state” can then be used to estimate 
the two key parameters of a CES social welfare function.  
 
When we prefer one state to another, it is because the social welfare assessment we 
use (in that particular comparison) for the preferred state is higher than the social 
welfare assessment of the non-preferred state (in that particular comparison). If we 
had two identically-good states, then we would expect that half our sample would 
prefer one state and half would prefer the other state. ),( ji xxp  is defined as the 
proportion of the sample preferring ix  to jx . 
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Thurstone (1927a, 1927b) outlined a simple method for scaling pairwise data that 
creates a cardinal scale, and we use the simplest (Case V) version here to scale social 
welfare judgements. This assumes that the social welfare assessments are 
independently and normally distributed with a common variance 2s . The Thurstone 
score assumes that ix  is preferred to jx  when an individual perceives that ix  has the 
higher social welfare than jx  . If these assessments of social welfare are )( ixW  and 
)( jxW , then ),( ji xxp  represents the proportion of our sample who perceive )( ixW  
as larger than )( jxW . Under the assumptions above, this is a function of the 
underlying mean difference between the two states ( ji WW - ). The Thurstone score 
transforms each proportion into standard normal scores and finds the average score 
for all of the comparisons using a state. This average score is our (unscaled) estimate 
of iW , where we consider all those choices using ix . Without loss of generality, we 
scale these scores so that 2W  = 1 and 3W =0.  
 
The Thurstone scores are based around a calculation of how often each state is 
preferred when it is compared to a state randomly chosen from all the possible states 
being compared (including itself). In this project, we consider a total of five states in 
each question. Here, there are 25 possible pairwise permutations, of which five see a 
state compared against itself (each state has a 50% chance of being preferred here). Of 
the remaining 20 permutations, we can infer the value of half of these from the 
remaining ten, since we know that one or the other must be preferred in each case. For 
the four reference states, the order of these states ( 4321 xxxx fff ) allows us to infer 
data since the monotonically superior state should be chosen in almost all cases. Six 
comparisons are provided in this way, leaving only four comparisons – 5x  versus 1x  
to 4x – to be identified in our survey work. 
 
The score for the study state ( 5W ) gives information about whether the study state is 
preferred in aggregate to each of the reference states. However, since these scaled 
scores are cardinally measurable social welfare values it also gives important 
information about how close the study state is (in social welfare terms) to these 
reference states.  
 
Consider Figure 1. The lower is 5W , the worse is the more unequal study state relative 
to the reference states, and so the less we have to move upwards from 4x  towards 1x  
to find an equivalent point that has equal social welfare to the study state. The 
equivalent state ( 6x ) is defined as 3x  + 5W ( 2x - 3x ). Where 5W =0, the equivalent 
state is 3x , whilst where 5W =1 the equivalent state is 2x . For 5W <0, the equivalent 
state is worse than 3x , and for 5W >0 it is better than 2x . It is possible that the 
equivalent state might be worse than the worst reference state or better than the best 
reference state in any comparison. The method will still allow the quantification of by 
how much better or worse the equivalent state (and thus the study state) is with 
respect to the reference states. 
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We can compute the scaled Thurstone scores using the aggregate preferences across 
all individuals, which then allow the construction of a set of equivalent states. These 
can then be used to estimate parameters in the SWF. Note, that whilst the values for 
the unscaled Thurstone scores are normally distributed, this is not the case for the 
scaled Thurstone scores, and hence also for the Thurstone-based equivalent state and 
the subsequent SWF parameters. As simple point estimates of uncertainty are of 
limited usefulness, we use bootstrapping to infer uncertainties. Bootstrapping assumes 
that the observed data are representative of the variation in the underlying population. 
A bootstrapping algorithm will select individuals at random and add them to a new 
(bootstrapped) dataset without removing them from the original dataset. This process 
continues until the bootstrapped dataset is of equal size to the original dataset. The 
analysis can be re-run on each new bootstrapped dataset and estimates obtained for 
equivalent states. Subsequent analyses can then also be re-run.  
 
3.4 Parameterising the SWF  
 
The Thurstone scores are used to infer an equivalent state (x6) that is approximately 
indifferent to the study state (x5). Given a set of n choice sets producing a pair of 
indifferent states (a study state plus equivalent state), define xi5 and xi6 as the ith pair 
of such states, where each is a vector of the time spent in each health/timing state 
(death whilst a child, severe ill health whilst a child, full health whilst a child, severe 
ill health as an adult, and full health as an adult). For simplicity, we re-define the 
function for lifetime health (consistent with the definition of Equation 1) as a function 
of the state considered and the parameters defining health for each group, l, that is: 
),,,;( SHAFHCSHCDCxv ijl . 
 
As our questions will always consider death after childhood, the value for DC will not 
be identified explicitly within the study, and so is excluded from the definition above. 
 
Social welfare correspondingly becomes: 
 ),,,,;(W SHAFHCSHCrxij a  
 = ( ) ( )( )[ ] rrijrij SHAFHCSHCxvSHAFHCSHCxv
1
),,;(1),,;( 21
--- -+ aa . 
 
In our estimated social welfare function, indifferent points should receive the same 
social welfare value (W), so that any difference between them can be interpreted as an 
error. The sum of squared differences errors across our data (X) is: 
( ) .),,,,;(W),,,,;(W
)|,,,,(E
1i
2
56å = -=
n
ii SHAFHCSHCrxSHAFHCSHCrx
XSHAFHCSHCr
aa
a
 
 
Within any question, a higher value for FHC will tend to leave the absolute 
differences (in spatial terms) between 5ix  and 6ix  reasonably constant, but will tend 
to decrease their relative differences – so a larger r is required, as in the example 
above. Unfortunately, as r rises, the effect is to compress the values found for W and 
so reduce the size of the differences between 5ix  and 6ix . This leads to non-
convergence since we can always reduce the sum of squared differences by increasing 
FHC and solving for the remaining parameters.     
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We therefore take a different approach in which we multiplicative separability and 
allow SHC to vary (so, use Equation 1). The value of the remaining parameters are 
found given a value for the inequality aversion: 
 ),|,,(E minimise XrSHAFHCSHC   
with respect to SHAFHCSHC ,, . 
 
Given this formulation, we define the error-minimising values of the parameters as 
)(rFHC , )(rSHA  and )(rSHC . Now also )(rk = )(rFHC  × )(rSHA - )(rSHC  
measures the difference between the value of SHC against the result that could be 
derived with multiplicative separability. Where 0)( =rk , Equation 2 holds. Within 
our testing, there appears to be a single solution in r for this case and so we are able to 
parameterise the basic social welfare function where 5.0=a . 
 
Within the general form of the SWF, the parameter a is used to capture the degree to 
which groups are treated differently for non-health reasons. The general method in 
finding values for this is to compare cases where questions include a particular 
characteristic – for example, a difference in the cause of a condition – with others 
whether the question do not. 
 
So given a set of questions, we first find sets of societally-equivalent points and these 
are then used to populate a social welfare function. However, this gives only a point 
estimate for the parameters of the social welfare function. This would be of relatively 
little value to decision makers (as a framework) even in an ideal world where all 
relevant methodological questions were answered, as it does not provide any 
indication of the inherent uncertainties in the analysis. To resolve this we use 
bootstrapping (sampling with replacement). Assuming that the data are representative 
of the underlying uncertainty, bootstrapping allows the construction of additional 
samples of the same size as the original sample. By re-running the analysis on these 
samples it is possible to estimate a distribution for each parameter. This distribution 
allows an estimate of uncertainty in the point estimate of each parameter. In this way, 
we can address the non-methodological uncertainties of our estimates. 
 
4. Study design 
 
4.1 Questionnaire format  
 
For each choice in the main preference elicitation task, respondents were asked which 
of two states they preferred and indifference between the states was accepted. Each 
choice is prefaced by a text box giving information about the choice context followed 
by the choice itself. As an illustration, Figure 2 displays one of the choices used in 
Choice Set 5.1.  Responses are asked “Which scenario would you prefer NICE to 
bring about?” and can indicate a preference for either option or indifference (“I don’t 
mind if it’s X or Y”). 
 
The main preference elicitation task is comprised of 16 choice sets in six questions, 
each composed of four choices between two states at a time. Table 1 summarises 
these choice sets and their purposes. Choice Sets 1.1-1.4 involve choices where all life 
years are lived in 100% health, after which all those in the groups die. There are no 
differences between the groups in the type of condition experienced, the rarity of the 
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condition, or the numbers in each group. They are used to test the CES functional 
form (where the health of adults and children are valued the same). These responses 
can also be used to find a value for the inequality aversion ( r ) parameter within the 
SWF, and provide an opportunity to gain familiarity with the question format.  
Figure 2: Example of choice context box and choice diagrams. 
 
About the groups:
Those in Group 1 experience an illness that is due to 
MRSA (“superbug”) infections picked up after NHS 
operations.
Those in Group 2 experience an illness that is caused by 
obesity.
The groups are similar in all other ways.  
X Group 1:60 years full health
8 years poor health 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Group 2:
56 years full health
8 years poor health 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Y
Group 2:
50 years full health
16 years poor health 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Group 1:
66 years full health
8 years poor health 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
 
 
 
Choice Sets 2.1-2.4 again involve choices in which there are no differences between 
groups on rarity and condition cause/responsibility grounds. In these choices, 
individuals may experience a period of ill health at 25% quality of life. These 
questions are used to find weights given for childhood versus adult health, 25% health 
versus 100% health, and a value of r. The next choice sets introduce a condition 
cause/responsibility dimension into choices that are otherwise identical to those in 
Choice Sets 2.1 and 2.3. Choice Sets 3.1 and 3.2 compare a Group 1 with NHS caused 
illnesses with a Group 2 that has illnesses partly caused by the patient’s lifestyle. 
Choice Sets 4.1 and 4.2 compares a Group 1 with NHS caused illnesses with a Group 
2 that has illnesses not caused by the patient’s lifestyle. These questions are used to 
find global (a ) weights representing the effect of condition cause. 
 
Choice Sets 5.1 and 5.2 repeat Sets 3.1 and 4.1 but name a more specific cause of 
illness rather than a general description of the type of illness. In place of NHS caused 
illnesses we have MRSA (Methicillin-Resistant Streptococcus Aureus) infections; 
non-NHS, partial patient condition causes are instead labelled “obesity”; and non-
patient, non-NHS illnesses are labelled as “workplace exposure to hazards” in Phase 
2. (In Phase 3 “genetic disorder” is used). These questions are used to find the effect 
of providing further information about illnesses. As the description of the causes are 
the only differences between Choice Sets 3.1 and 5.1 (and 4.1 and 5.2), we can tell  
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Table 1: The structure of the preference elicitation task 
Question Choice Sets Illness Data used to derive: 
1 1.1-1.4 No Inequality aversion (standard QALY model assumed to hold) 
2 2.1-2.4 Yes Lifetime health judgements (social value of timing of ill health) 
inequality aversion (where QALY model does not hold). 
3 & 4 3.1-3.2, 4.1-4.2 Yes Effect of condition cause/responsibility (abstract descriptions) (with 2.1-2.4) 
5 5.1-5.2 Yes Effect of condition cause/responsibility (labels) (with 2.1-2.4, 3.1, 4.1) 
6 6.1-6.2 Yes Effect of condition rarity (with 1.2) 
 
Choice Sets Description of Group 1 Description of Group 2 
1.1-2.4 Groups 1 and 2 are identical except in the health that they experience 
3.1-3.2 Those in Group 1 experience an illness that is not the result 
of their lifestyles but is instead caused by errors within the 
NHS. 
Those in Group 2 experience an illness that is caused by a combination of 
factors including poverty, genetics, pollution, and the patients’ lifestyles. 
5.1 
 
Those in Group 1 experience an illness that is due to MRSA 
(“superbug”) infections picked up after NHS operations. 
Those in Group 2 experience an illness that is caused by obesity. 
4.1-4.2 Those in Group 1 experience an illness that is not the result 
of their lifestyles but is instead caused by errors within the 
NHS. 
Those in Group 2 experience an illness that is caused by a combination of 
factors including poverty, genetics and pollution, but is not caused by 
patients’ lifestyles or by NHS error. 
5.2 Those in Group 1 experience an illness that is due to MRSA 
(“superbug”) infections picked up after NHS operations. 
Those in Group 3 experience an illness that is due to workplace exposure 
to hazardous substances (e.g. asbestosis). 
 
Those in Group 3 experience an illness that is due to a genetic condition 
that affects the health of people in middle-age.  
6.1 Those in Group 1 and Group 2 both experience illnesses that are caused by a combination of factors  
including poverty, genetics and pollution, but are not caused by patients’ lifestyles or by NHS error. 
 
There are equal numbers of patients in both groups. 
6.2 Those in Group 3 and Group 4 both experience illnesses that are caused by a combination of factors  
including poverty, genetics and pollution, but are not caused by patients’ lifestyles or by NHS error. 
 
The illness affecting those in Group 3 is extremely rare, and the illness affecting those in Group 4 is  
slightly more common. Your choice will affect an equal number of patients in Groups 3 and 4. 
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whether preferences differ in the more-abstract categorical (Choice Set 3.1/4.1) and 
the less-abstract labelled case (Choice Set 5.1/5.2). 
 
Choice Sets 6.1 and 6.2 are largely stand-alone and assess the effect of rarity of 
diseases on choices. In Choice Set 6.1, both groups suffer from an equally common 
condition and in Choice Set 6.2 one group suffers from a rarer condition. Respondents 
are instructed that the numbers affected in each group remain the same in all four 
cases. 
 
An additional study considers further the issues of timing and severity to provide 
additional information to parameterise the SWF. It introduced illnesses at times other 
than at the start and end of life with illnesses affecting individuals at 10 and 30 years 
of age. It also considers 50% health in place of 25% health. Data were obtained in 
nine choice sets across three questions (A1-A3). Question A1 includes four Choice 
Sets (A1.1-A1.4), of which the first two are used only to give respondents some 
experience of the question format before the substantive data is obtained. In Question 
A1, all ill health occurs at the end of life. Question A2 varies the time at which ill-
health occurs from the start of life (A2.1, A2.2) to 10 years of age (A2.3) and 30 years 
of age (A2.4). Question A3 uses a study state from the main study to allow 
comparison between the 25% and 50% study states. 
 
Table 2 outlines the study and reference states used in the additional study. (Choice 
Sets A1.1 and A1.2 are not included in this table as they are used only to “warm up” 
respondents.) Note that Choice Sets A1.3-A1.4 and A2.1-A2.2 are identical to Choice 
Sets 2.1-2.4 with the 25% health states substituted for 50% health states with half the 
duration. Choice Sets A2.3 and A2.4 are identical to A1.3 with 8 years of illness 
moved from the end of life. 
 
Table 2: Additional study questions 
Study States Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
Choice Set 
A1.3 
66 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
50 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
Choice Set 
A1.4 
72 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
48 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
Choice Set 
A2.1 
66 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
2 years in 50% health 
54 years in 100% health 
2 years in 50% health 
Choice Set 
A2.2 
4 years in 50% health 
72 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
48 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
Choice Set 
A2.3 
66 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
10 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
40 years in 100% health 
Choice Set 
A2.4 
66 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
30 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
20 years in 100% health 
Choice Set 
A3.1 
66 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
50 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
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Table 2 (cont.): 
 
Reference 
States 
Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
1x  62 years in 100% health 
8 years in 50% health 
60 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
2x  60 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
56 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
3x  59 years in 100% health 
2 years in 50% health 
54 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
4x  58 years in 100% health 52 years in 100% health 
4 years in 50% health 
 
4.2 Analysis 
 
The homotheticity property of the CES function allows us to make predictions about 
societal preferences regarding different distributions of health. In Question 1, the 
groups are identical except in the health they receive and so a =0.50 is assumed. 
Given this assumption, our analysis for Question 1 (Choice Sets 1.1 to 1.4) finds the r 
values that correspond to a SWF that assumes that the standard QALY model holds. 
As Choice Sets 1.3 and 1.4 were derived by halving the total number of life years 
enjoyed in Choice Sets 1.1 and 1.2 in all states, then it also halves the number of 
QALYs received. If the number of QALYs describes how society judges individual 
lifetime health, then the CES function predicts that the same amount of inequality 
aversion should be exhibited in both cases. If this does not hold then either the QALY 
does not measure individual preferences or homotheticity does not hold (or neither 
holds). 
 
When analysing Sets 1.1 to 1.4, we assess the consistency of individual choices 
against the predictions of the CES-SWF. We do this by comparing responses across 
questions to look for differences in inequality aversion in similar-sized questions (1.1 
vs. 1.2; 1.3 vs. 1.4), and when homotheticity is tested (1.1 vs. 1.3; 1.2 vs. 1.4). Choice 
Sets 2.1 to 2.4 are used to construct both an alternative to the standard QALY when 
considering lifetime health from a societal perspective and to estimate the degree of 
inequality aversion exhibited in the data. These choices are analysed in terms of 
“Adult Healthy Year Equivalents” or AHYEs, v1 and v2, which like the QALY 
combine information regarding both health (quality of life) and the timing of health. 
In Question 2, we use 5.0=a  as Groups 1 and 2 are identical in all respects except 
the health they receive. 
 
The timing variable takes two values, and distinguishes between the health 
experienced prior to 18 years of age and all health experienced at and above this age. 
Health takes three levels, being dead, 25% and 100% health. These judgements may 
be consistent with conventional unweighted QALYs but they may give different 
weights to ill health at different ages than suggested by the QALY model. The AHYE 
reflects these judgements and values a profile of health using the number of years in 
full health as an adult that would be equivalent to it. Where the conventional 
unweighted QALY model adequately describes societal health judgements, the two 
concepts coincide. 
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Given the study and Thurstone-equivalent states for Choice Sets 2.1 to 2.4, we can 
estimate a basic form for the SWF (using AHYEs) in the case where the groups are 
identical in non-health respects ( 5.0=a ). Earlier choice sets from Question 1 are 
ignored here because they do not consider periods of ill-health, and there is a concern 
that this may affect the responses given. (Later choice sets from Questions 3 onwards 
are ignored at this stage because α will not typically equal 0.5.) Of interest here is 
whether, and how, these estimates differ from the normal assumptions of cost-
effectiveness analysis: 
· Do overall preferences exhibit inequality aversion – that is, is the inequality 
parameter ( r ), typically greater than negative one?  
· Is there extra weight placed on the health of children versus those of adults – 
that is, does 1== FHAFHC ?  
· Is there a premium (discount) placed on the value of 25% health over the 25% 
that cost-effectiveness analysis assumes?  
 
Within the general form of the SWF, the parameter a is used to capture the degree to 
which groups are treated differently for non-health reasons. In order to assess the 
effect of condition cause/responsibility, we compare cases where this information is 
provided, with otherwise identical cases where it is not. The states in Choice Set 2.1 
also appear as 3.1, 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2. The states in Choice Set 2.3 appear as 3.2 and 4.2. 
In each case, the condition cause choice sets in questions 3 and 4 are compared to the 
baseline choice set in question 2. 
 
The trade-offs where health differences do not exist between the groups – i.e. where 
only a may differ – are found by again comparing the results from Choice Sets 2.1 
and 2.3 with those of Choice Sets 3.1-5.2. For Choice Sets 2.1 and 2.3, we solve to 
find the a providing identical social welfare values between the study and equivalent 
states in each case. This provides a baseline figure (a0) correcting for any residual 
error in the question – which is likely to exist because the main estimates of r, FHC 
and SHA are based reducing error across Choice Sets 2.1-2.4 as a whole. For these 
baseline cases, the marginal rate of substitution in the absence of health differences 
equals a0/(1-a0). 
 
We also solve for the individual parameter values (a1) for Choice Sets 3.1-4.2, with 
corresponding marginal rates of substitution (a1/(1-a1)). The effect of the condition 
cause label (in the absence of health differences) is the ratio of the two marginal rates 
of substitution. Similarly, by comparing Choice Sets 3.1 and 5.1, and 4.1 and 5.2, we 
can consider the impact of labels versus the more abstract descriptions. Condition 
rarity is considered in Question 6. As with the condition cause questions above, we 
can define Choice Set 6.1 – where there is no difference in rarity – as the baseline and 
Choice Set 6.2 – where the same numbers are used but Group 3 has a very rare 
condition – as the comparator.  
 
Bootstrapping is used to assess the uncertainty in the parameter estimates. Microsoft 
Excel was used to resample the data, with a random number generator to identify rows 
within the database containing complete data on Choice Sets 1.1 to 6.2 in the 
preference elicitation task. By sampling the same number of rows as we have 
individuals with complete data, we can find a new dataset that reflects a similar level 
of heterogeneity as the original dataset. By repeating the analysis (finding equivalent 
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states and parameter values) multiple times, we can estimate the uncertainty in each 
parameter value. For the main parameter estimates, a sample of 5000 observations 
was used, as this was considered likely to allow convergence when estimating of 
parameter uncertainty. Convergence was assessed by examining how quickly 
parameter estimates of standard deviation reached its final value. This was then used 
to estimate the necessary number of iterations in subsequent analyses. 
 
We also consider whether the SWF parameters differ according to background 
characteristics in the main study. In each of the 12 respondent characteristic group, 
values for the parameters r, FHC and SHA (with SHAFHYSHY ´= ) are found 
using preferences from Choice Sets 2.1-2.4. Uncertainty is again computed using 
bootstrapping, and comparisons are made the 12 respondent subgroups. 
 
If differences are found by background characteristics, then the main analysis results 
may depend on the makeup of the sample itself. We therefore construct a virtual 
sample that is broadly representative of the general public where background 
differences affect preferences. In this sample, we require that the twelve background 
groups (gender ´ education ´ age) should be selected in the proportions they appear in 
the general public. This can be done using bootstrapping methods to provide both a 
central estimate for parameter values and uncertainty. We therefore re-run our 
analyses by resampling to our original sample size but require that each population 
subgroup provides the “correct” number of respondents when split by age, sex and 
education. 
 
Within the main analysis of the project, we assume that all health below the age of 18 
is “childhood” health, and all health after the age of 18 is “adult” health. Whilst the 
split between adult and childhood health is necessary within the analysis, the precise 
cut-off does not necessarily fall at 18. 
 
Table 3 reports the background of the sample against data from the 2001 Census (or 
closest equivalent). In general, the sample is roughly representative in terms of age 
and gender (although our sample includes more 60-69 year olds). We slightly under-
represent non-white ethnicities and those with disability/chronic illness, and over-
represent the retired and those with higher or further education. Note, however, that 
the disability comparison is slightly different (“Do you consider yourself to be a 
disabled person” versus limiting long term illness. In any event, given that we correct 
for non-representative preferences in the sensitivity analysis (on age, sex and 
education), any non-representativeness is not a major concern. 
 
Overall, nine interviewers were used to obtain the 559 interviews with complete data. 
Recruitment to the additional study took place in the two months following the main 
study. The additional study sampling was not designed to provide a mix of 
backgrounds but instead aimed to allow a quicker convenience sample which would 
provide indicative results only. Of the 130 interviews, 129 individuals provided 
complete data over the choice sets A1.3-A3.1. This sample was 47% female, 95% 
white, and with 37% above the age of 60. 53% were employed and 31% retired, with 
and 15% disabled. A larger proportion of those in the additional study owned their 
own homes or were mortgagees (91%). 
 
 19 
Table 3: Background of the sample 
Sample size  Main sample 
(%) 
2001 Census 
(%) 
Gender: Female 55 52 
18-29 20a 19 
30-39 16 20 
40-49 17 17 
50-59 15 16 
60-69 17 12 
Age: 
70+ 15 15 
Ethnicity White 95 92b 
Self-employed 7 8 
Other Employed 39 52 
Employment 
status: 
Retired 29 14 
School only 47 78b Education: 
HE/FE 53 22b 
House ownership: Owned/mortgage 71 71c 
Disabled? Yes 14 18d 
s Includes 14 aged below 18. 
b Ages 16-74 only 
c 2000 data. Office of National Statistics. 
d Limiting long-term illness . 
 
 
5. Results  
 
5.1 Inequality aversion 
 
The Thurstone scores were found to place all the study states between 2x  and 3x  in 
preference terms, and this is consistent with the CES-SWF at an aggregate level. The 
scaled Thurstone score for the study state W( 5x ) can also be used to define an 
“equivalent” state: 
6x  = W( 5x ) 2x +(1-W( 5x )) 3x  
 
Table 4 gives the study states and equivalent states that would be valued equally for 
each choice set. Within Choice Sets 1.1 to 1.4, the aggregate preferences suggest a 
trade-off between total health and reducing inequalities. In Choice Set 1.1, for 
example, respondents are willing to sacrifice 5.84 QALYs (70.00 – 64.16 QALYs) to 
the better off group in order to obtain 2.16 QALYs (58.16 – 56.00 QALYs) for the 
worse off group. This suggests an implicit marginal rate of substitution between the 
health of the worst off to the best off of 2.7; that is, the health of the worst is worth 2.7 
that of the health of the best off. For the other choice sets, this figure varies from 1.42 
(Choice Set 1.4) to 1.94 (Choice Set 1.3). 
 
Table 5 gives the inequality aversion parameters, r, and measures of uncertainty 
within this for Choice Sets 1.1 to 1.4 under the assumption that the QALY describes 
the way that society judges lifetime health. For example, the trade-off for Choice Set 
1.1 suggests an inequality aversion parameter of r = 5.24. The central estimates for 
the r parameters appear to differ across the four choice sets. Consider a standard case 
where Group 1 has a life expectancy of 70 years in full health and Group 2 has a life 
expectancy of 60 years in full health. The inequality aversion estimate from Choice 
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Set 1 would suggest that this is equivalent to case where both groups live 63.83 years 
in full health. Here, Group 1 loses 6.17 years and Group 2 gains 3.83 years, 
suggesting that across these improvements Group 2’s health is worth 61% more than 
Group 1’s health (6.17/3.83-1). For Choice Sets, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, the comparable 
figures are 21%, 38% and 13%, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Question 1 Choice States and Equivalents 
Choice Set & 
States 
Group 1 Health Group 2 Health Trade-offs 
Study State 70 years in 100% 
health 
56 years in 100% health 
Equivalent 64.16 years in 100% 
health 
58.16 years in 100% 
health 
1.1 
Difference - 5.84 QALYs + 2.16 QALYs 
2.70 QALYs (Group 
1) per QALY 
(Group 2) 
Study State 74 years in 100% 
health 
52 years in 100% health 
Equivalent 63.80 years in 100% 
health 
57.80 years in 100% 
health 
1.2 
Difference - 10.2 QALYs + 2.80 QALYs 
3.64 QALYs (Group 
1) per QALY 
(Group 2) 
Study State 35 years in 100% 
health 
28 years in 100% health 
Equivalent 32.36 years in 100% 
health 
29.36 years in 100% 
health 
1.3 
Difference - 2.64 QALYs + 1.36 QALYs 
1.94 QALYs (Group 
1) per QALY 
(Group 2) 
Study State 37 years in 100% 
health 
26 years in 100% health 
Equivalent 32.31 years in 100% 
health 
29.31 years in 100% 
health 
1.4 
Difference -4.69 QALYs + 2.31 QALYs 
2.03 QALYs (Group 
1) per QALY 
(Group 2) 
Results from samples of 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
Table 5: Inequality parameter (r) estimates by choice set 
Choice 
Set Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std 
Dev 95% CI 
1.1 5.24 3.64 6.96 0.50 ( 4.266, 6.216) 
1.2 1.51 0.78 2.19 0.19 ( 1.139, 1.871) 
1.3 3.16 1.68 5.01 0.45 ( 2.289, 4.041) 
1.4 0.55 -0.05 6.96 0.18 ( 0.207, 0.895) 
Estimates based on 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
However, the differences found between Choice Sets 1.1 and 1.3, and between Choice 
Sets 1.2 and 1.4 do appear to suggest a general violation of the CES-SWF in the case 
considered here, so that QALYs and AHYEs are expected to differ. We therefore 
relax the assumption that the standard QALY model is being used by individuals and 
in such cases we would not expect these pairs of choice sets to produce the same 
values for r, since halving standard QALYs is unlikely to halve the societal value of 
that health. As an illustration, suppose that childhood health is valued ten times as 
much as adult health. Living for 30 years (= 18+12) in full health provides 18´10+12 
= 192 AHYEs. Halving this, 15 years in full health provides 15´10 = 150 AHYEs. 
Where timing affects preferences, we cannot test homotheticity directly. 
 
Table 6 shows both the study states and their social welfare equivalents in Choice Sets 
2.1 to 2.4. Within each of the equivalent states, ill-health always occurs at the end of 
life so, for instance, the equivalent state in Choice Set 2.1 involves 59.23 years of full 
health, followed by 4.92 years in severe health. The trade-offs defined in these states 
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are complex, as they involve periods in ill-health, periods in good health, health as 
children and health as adults. By changing the parameters in the SWF, we seek to find 
the solution that gives the least difference in social welfare across the pairs of states. 
 
Table 6: Question 2 study states and equivalents 
Choice Set & 
States 
Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
2.1 Study State 66 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
50 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
 Equivalent 59.23 years in 100% health 
4.92 years in 25% health 
54.46 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
2.2 Study State 66 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
4 years in 25% health 
54 years in 100% health 
4 years in 25% health 
 Equivalent 59.40 years in 100% health 
5.61 years in 25% health 
54.81 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
2.3 Study State 72 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
48 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
 Equivalent 59.23 years in 100% health 
4.92 years in 25% health 
54.46 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
2.4 Study State 8 years in 25% health 
72 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
48 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
 Equivalent 59.34 years in 100% health 
5.34 years in 25% health 
54.67 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
Results from samples of 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
Figure 3 plots the study and equivalent states together and it is clear that straight lines 
between these points do intersect (the two steeper lines (2.2, 2.4) are those where 
childhood illness may occur.) However, we can still note that there is a clear trade-off 
between average health and reducing inequalities in all cases, since the slope of all 
curves is less than one. 
 
Figure 3: Choice Set 2 study state and equivalent points: AHYEs 
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The mean parameters, their estimated standard deviations, and 95% CI are presented 
in Table 7, along with the assumptions of a standard QALY-based CEA. The standard 
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CEA assumes no inequality aversion in its objective function (r = -1), whilst the SWF 
found here has significantly higher inequality aversion, with an inequality aversion 
significantly above 5. Consider a standard case where Group 1 has a life expectancy 
of 70 years in full health and Group 2 has a life expectancy of 60 years in full health; 
in terms of social welfare this is equivalent to a case in which both receive 64.76 years 
in full health.  
 
Formally, this is analysed in terms of AHYEs where Groups 1 and 2 receive 84.9 
(1.828*18 + 1.000*52) and 74.9 (1.828*18 + 1.000*42) AHYEs. This is equivalent to 
a case in which both receive 79.66 AHYEs (1.828*18 + 1.000*46.76). Group 1 loses 
6.12 years and Group 2 gains 3.88 years of full health as an adult; over this change, 
Group 2’s health is valued 57% more highly than the health of Group 1. (Since both 
changes concern adult full health years the same trade-off is made regardless of 
whether we consider QALYs or AHYEs.) 
 
Table 7: SWF parameters; standard CEA assumptions and study estimates 
Choice Set Label CEA 
Study 
Estimates 
Standard 
Deviation 95% CI 
Inequality aversion 
parameter r -1.00 6.32 0.29 ( 5.76, 6.88) 
Lifetime health judgements 
Value of 100% health as an 
adult FHA 1.000 1.000 - - 
Value of 100% health as a 
child FHC 1.000 1.828 0.031 ( 1.768, 1.888) 
Value of 25% health as an 
adult SHA 0.250 0.268 0.012 ( 0.244, 0.292) 
Value of 25% health to a 
child SHC 0.250 0.490 0.027 ( 0.439, 0.542) 
Estimates based on 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
The standard QALY values 25% health for an adult as worth 0.250 times as much as a 
full year in 100% to an adult: at 0.268, this weight is not significantly different in the 
AHYE. The standard QALY also values 25% health for a child as worth 0.250 times 
as much as a full year in 100% to an adult. In contrast, our results suggest that 25% 
health as a child is worth 0.490 AHYEs, which is significantly more than its QALY 
weight (since the AHYE and QALY both agree on the value of an adult full health 
year). Overall, the AHYEs gives 96% more weight to the first 25% health for children 
relative to that given by the standard QALY. 
 
5.2 Condition cause/responsibility 
 
Table 8 provides the study states and equivalent states up to Choice Set 4.2, along 
with summary information regarding the cause of illness. Each pair of study and 
equivalent states suggests a trade-off between the health of one group and the health 
of the other. For Choice Set 2.1, which is neutral with respect to the allocation of 
responsibilities and thus will be used as the baseline, Group 1 loses 6.77 years in 
100% health and 3.08 years in 25% health, whilst Group 2 gains 4.46 years in 100% 
health whilst losing 8 years in 25% health. In terms of societal judgements of health, 
Group 1 loses 7.60 AHYEs (6.77 + 0.268×3.08) and Group 2 gains 2.31 AHYEs (4.46 
– 0.268×8).  
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In Choice Set 3.1, Group 1 has an NHS-caused disease and Group 2 has a disease due 
to non-NHS causes that are partially due to the patient’s lifestyle. Here, Group 1 loses 
7.03 AHYEs and Group 2 gains 2.86 AHYEs. Compared to the neutral Choice Set 
2.1, here in Choice Set 3.1 where condition cause/responsibility is included, the public 
is less willing to sacrifice health to Group 1 in order to gain more health for Group 2; 
a AHYE to Group 2 is worth 3.28 AHYEs to Group 1 in Choice Set 2.1, and 2.46 
AHYEs to Group 1 in Choice Set 3.1. The difference between these figures is 
interpreted as being due to the condition cause/responsibility, with a higher value is 
placed on NHS-caused diseases than ones in which the patient is partially responsible. 
 
Table 8: Equivalent states by condition cause/responsibility 
Choice Set(s) 
and States 
Group 1 Health Group 2 Health Trade-offs 
2.1, 3.1, 4.1 
Study state 
66 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
50 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
 
(Baseline) 
59.23 years in 100% 
health 
4.92 years in 25% health 
(Baseline) 
54.46 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
2.1 
Equivalent 
state 
-7.60 AHYEs + 2.26 AHYEs 
3.28 AHYEs (Group 
1) 
per AHYE (Group 2) 
(NHS causes) 
59.50 years in 100% 
health 
6.01 years in 25% health 
(Non-NHS, patient) 
55.01 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
3.1 
Equivalent 
state 
-7.03 AHYEs + 2.86 AHYEs 
2.46 AHYEs  
(NHS causes) 
per AHYE  
(Non-NHS, patient) 
(NHS causes) 
59.42 years in 100% 
health 
5.67 years in 25% health 
(Non-NHS, non-patient) 
54.83 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
4.1 
Equivalent 
state 
-7.21 AHYEs + 2.69 AHYEs 
2.68 AHYEs  
(NHS causes) 
per AHYE  
(Non-NHS, non-
patient) 
2.3, 3.2, 4.2 
Study state 
72 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
48 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
 
(Baseline) 
59.23 years in 100% 
health 
4.92 years in 25% health 
(Baseline) 
54.46 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
2.3 
Equivalent 
state 
-15.74 AHYEs + 4.31 AHYEs 
3.65 AHYEs (Group 
1) 
Per AHYE (Group 2) 
(NHS causes) 
59.52 years in 100% 
health 
6.08 years in 25% health 
(Non-NHS, partial 
patient) 
55.04 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
3.2 
Equivalent 
state 
-15.14 AHYEs + 4.90 AHYEs 
3.09 AHYEs  
(NHS causes) 
per AHYE  
(Non-NHS, patient) 
(NHS causes) 
59.45 years in 100% 
health 
5.80 years in 25% health 
(Non-NHS, non-patient) 
54.90 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
4.2 
Equivalent 
state 
-15.29 AHYEs + 4.75 AHYEs 
3.22 AHYEs  
(NHS causes) 
per AHYE  
(Non-NHS, non-
patient) 
Results from samples of 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
In Choice Set 4.1, Group 1 has an NHS-caused disease and Group 2 has a disease due 
to non-NHS causes that are not due to the patient’s lifestyle. Here, Group 1 loses 6.58 
years in 100% health and 2.33 years in 25% health (7.21 AHYEs), whilst Group 2 
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gains 4.83 years in 100% health and loses 8 years in 25% health (a gain of 2.69 
AHYEs). Compared to the neutral Choice Set 2.1, here in Choice Set 4.1 where 
condition cause/responsibility is included, the public is again less willing to sacrifice 
health to Group 1 in order to gain more health for Group 2; a AHYE to Group 2 is 
worth 3.28 AHYEs to Group 1 in Choice Set 2.1, and 2.68 AHYEs to Group 1 in 
Choice Set 4.1. This suggests that more value is placed on NHS-caused diseases than 
ones in which illness is not due to non-NHS, non-patient causes. 
 
Taken together, these two findings suggest that NHS-caused diseases may attract a 
higher value than the other two categories, with more value placed on diseases that are 
not due to patient lifestyle than those that are. Comparing Choice Sets 2.3 (no 
condition causes), 3.2, and 4.2 suggests a similar pattern.  
 
Table 9 shows the significance of these weights. Relative to the case of non-NHS, 
non-patient causes, the case where patient lifestyle is a contributing factor is given 
8.3% less weight (significant) in the questions based on Choice Set 2.1 and 4% less 
weight (insignificant) in those based on Choice Set 2.3. The case where illnesses are 
caused by NHS actions is significant in both comparisons, receiving 22.6% and 14.1% 
higher weight. 
 
Table 9: Weights on condition cause/responsibility 
 Choice Sets 2.1, 3.1, 4.1 
Choice Sets 2.3, 3.2, 
4.2 
 Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
Non-NHS, non-patient 
causes 1.000 - 1.000 - 
Partial patient causes 0.917 
(0.842, 
0.992) 0.960 
(0.919, 
1.001) 
NHS causes 1.226 
(1.107, 
1.334) 1.141 
(1.076, 
1.207) 
Estimates based on 5000 bootstrapped observations per phase 
 
These findings are based on relatively abstract descriptions of the cause of illness and 
in practice these may cover a range of causes that people would have very different 
reactions to. In Phase 2, we compared MRSA (NHS cause), obesity (partial patient 
cause) and workplace exposure to hazardous substances (non-NHS, non-patient 
cause). In Phase 3, we replaced this last factor with a genetic condition affecting 
people in middle age. 
 
Choice Sets 5.1 and 5.2 are used to assess the effect of these labels, and are in effect 
“labelled” versions of the more abstract Choice Sets 3.1 and 4.1. Again, the difference 
between the equivalent and study states for each choice set allows the identification of 
a change in health for both groups that yields the same social welfare. These changes 
can, as above, be represented in terms of societal health judgements and an average 
trade-off can be found. Table 10 presents these trade-offs for both comparisons 
(Choice Sets 3.1 vs 5.1 and 4.1 vs 5.1). There is generally less preference to treating 
obesity-related conditions over MRSA than when considering NHS caused versus 
partially patient caused diseases (comparing Choice Sets 3.1 and 5.1). In Phase 3, 
there appears to be a very similar priority the labelled case as generally given to the 
unlabelled case. In Phase 2, there appears to be slightly more priority given to treating 
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workplace hazards (vs MRSA) than to treating the more generic non-patient caused 
diseases. 
 
The figures here suggest that individuals would accept some inequality whereby those 
who are obese receive less lifetime health than those who suffer illness due to a 
genetic condition. Larger inequalities would mean that society prioritises the health of 
the obese group over those with genetic conditions; smaller inequalities would mean 
that society prioritises the group with the genetic condition. Since these effects modify 
the degree to which inequality is taken into account, it is inappropriate to use them in 
isolation of the main inequality aversion parameter. Or, in other words, the weights 
here are derived from the α weights alone, and not the trade-offs made in the social 
welfare function where health differences are considered. 
 
Table 10: Equivalent health changes and trade-offs: label effects 
Choice Set(s) 
and States 
Group 1 Health Group 2 Health Trade-offs 
Study State 66 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
50 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
 
(NHS causes) 
59.50 years in 100% 
health 
6.01 years in 25% health 
(Non-NHS, patient) 
55.01 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
3.1 
Equivalent 
state 
-7.03 AHYEs + 2.86 AHYEs 
2.46 AHYEs  
(NHS causes) 
per AHYE  
(Non-NHS, patient) 
(MRSA) 
59.66 years in 100% 
health 
6.65 years in 25% health 
(Obesity) 
55.33 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
5.1 
Equivalent 
state 
- 6.70 AHYEs + 3.18 AHYE 
2.11 AHYEs (MRSA)  
per AHYE (Obesity) 
(NHS causes) 
59.42 years in 100% 
health 
5.67 years in 25% health 
(Non-NHS, non-patient) 
54.83 years in 100% 
health 
8 years in 25% health 
4.1 
Equivalent 
state 
-7.21 AHYEs + 2.69 AHYEs 
2.68 AHYEs  
(NHS causes) 
per AHYE  
(Non-NHS, non-
patient) 
(MRSA) 
59.30 years in 100% health 
5.21 years in 25% health 
(Workplace hazards) 
54.61 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
5.2 
(Phase 2) 
Equivalent 
state - 7.49 AHYE + 2.34 AHYE 
3.20 AHYEs (MRSA) 
per AHYE  
(Workplace 
hazards) 
(MRSA) 
59.35 years in 100% health 
5.41 years in 25% health 
(Genetic disorder) 
54.70 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
5.2 
(Phase 3) 
Equivalent 
state - 7.30 AHYE + 2.69 AHYE 
2.72 AHYEs (MRSA) 
per AHYE  
(Genetic disorder) 
Results from samples of 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
Note, however, that if the obesity group achieves less lifetime health then these health 
differences would suggest (in isolation of condition-cause/responsibility weights) they 
should receive greater priority. Beyond a critical difference in health, society would 
prefer to treat the obesity-related conditions because the differences in lifetime health 
outweighs the differences in condition cause. This was the case in Choice Set 5.1, 
where the overall preference gave twice the weight to treating less healthy, obese 
group relative to the healthier group suffering from MRSA. 
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5.3 Rarity 
 
Choice Sets 6.1 and 6.2 are used to assess the effect of condition rarity. Table 11 
outlines the equivalent health changes (the difference between the study states and 
equivalent states) for these two choice sets. In both choice sets, society appears to be 
more willing to prioritise the health of Group 2, as the less healthy group. In Choice 
Set 5.1, where there are no differences in rarity, a single AHYE to Group 2 is worth as 
much as 4.66 AHYEs to Group 1, whilst in Choice Set 6.1 where rarity is introduced, 
this falls to 4.00 AHYEs. This suggests that society may be more willing to prioritise 
groups with more rare conditions over less rare conditions. These figures relate to a 
question in which there is a health difference between the groups. 
 
Where there are no health differences between the groups, then If the rare condition is 
given a weight of 1.00 (versus another “rare” condition, 5.0=a , MRS = 
15.01 5.01 == --aa ) then the very rare condition is given a weight of 1.19 ( 543.0=a , MRS 
= 19.1543.01 543.01 == --aa ) versus the rare condition). The difference between these two 
weights is not statistically significant (95% CI = 0.785-1.597).  
 
Table 11: Equivalent health changes and trade-offs: condition rarity 
 Group 1 Health Group 2 Health Trade-offs 
(Rare) 
+2.01 years in 100% health 
-20 years in 25% health 
(Rare) 
+5.01 years in 100% health 
-16 years in 25% health 
6.1 
- 3.35 AHYE + 0.72 AHYE 
4.66 AHYEs (G1)  
per AHYE (G2) 
(Very rare) 
-6.43 years in 100% health 
-1.72 years in 25% health 
(Rare) 
+5.14 years in 100% health 
-8 years in 25% health 
6.2 
- 3.26 AHYE + 0.81 AHYE 
4.00 AHYEs (G1, more 
rare)  
per AHYE (G2, less rare) 
 
5.4 Background characteristics 
 
The effect of personal characteristics was assessed by comparing the values for the 
parameters a, FHC and SHA (with SHAFHCSHC ´= ). The analysis compared 
values for both the 12 population subgroups and between those varying over a series 
of other background characteristics (health, disability, insurance, health and political 
beliefs). The bootstrapping used 200 resamples of the data for the latter comparisons, 
and 5000 for the former due to some instances where estimates in the population 
subgroups did not lead to convergence. The tables below should be interpreted with 
reference to Table 10 above, presenting the main baseline results with all respondents 
pooled. 
 
The 12 population subgroups subdivide the main sample by age, gender and 
education. To simplify the analysis, we use the following notation: “GxSyAz” 
represents these groups; for x = 1 we have males, x = 2 females, y = 1 school 
educated, y = 2 HE/FE educated, z = 1 under 40s, z = 2 aged 40-59, z = 3 over 60s. 
Our estimates allowed all inequality aversion and indifference to inequality. 
Convergence issues were identified with bootstrapped resamples, and in 10 of the 12 
groups, all 5000 cases converged within the bootstrapping. The other groups were 
female, school educated groups, with under 0.1% of cases in under 40 year olds and 
0.4% of cases for over 60 year olds failing to converge.  
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We also found a series of cases in which r = -1, which represents the case where 
individuals are indifferent to inequality; lower values are not possible without the 
preferences being inequality seeking. In these cases, we also find negative values 
below -0.250 (and above –0.40) for health at 25% in both adult and child cases. The 
number of these cases varies, with 8 out of the 12 groups showing at least one case, 
and more than 1% of cases in the school educated, female group aged 40-59 (1.2%), 
and the HE/FE educated groups who were female and aged under 40 (13.9%), male 
and aged 40-59 (2.5%), and female and aged over 60 (4.6%). We proceed by 
considering only these convergent, inequality neutral/inequality averse bootstrapped 
cases.  
 
Figure 4 shows the 95% confidence intervals for the r parameters within these 
convergent, inequality averse bootstrap cases (as before, based on Choice Sets 2.1-
2.4). Here, we find five significant differences in the sensitivity to inequality: the 
male, HE/FE educated, 40-59 group (G1S2A2) has the lowest average inequality 
aversion of the twelve subgroups (r= 4.60), and is significantly different from the two 
groups with the highest estimated aversion – the male, school educated, under 40 
group (r = 7.45, G1S1A1) and the female, school educated, 60+ group (r = 9.96, 
G2S1A3). This latter group has significantly higher inequality aversion than four other 
groups – the two male, 40-59 groups (r = 4.60 and 5.33; G1S2A2 and G1S1A2); and the 
female, HE/FE, under 40 and 60+ groups(r = 6.52, r = 6.48; G2S2A3 and G2S2A1). As a 
rule, the more highly educated groups (those with “S2”) appear to display less 
inequality aversion than the other groups. 
 
Figure 4 Inequality aversion parameter - 95%CI for converging, inequality averse 
cases
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Respondents who were female, school educated, and aged between 40 and 59 give the 
highest weight to childhood health (FHC= 2.084, G2S1A2). This value is significantly 
higher than both women aged under 40 group (FHC = 1.770 and 1.709, G2S1A1, 
 28 
G2S2A2), men who are HE/FE educated and aged between 40 and 59 (FHC = 1.608, 
G1S2A2), and HE/FE educated women aged over 60 (FHC = 1.661, G2S2A3). All 
groups gave values for childhood full health significantly above the adult value (FHA 
= 1.000 for all groups). 
 
It appears that the value given to severe-ill health as an adult (SHA) generally 
increases with age. The under 40s groups, on average, give a value of 0.213 to the 
first 25% of health, compared to 0.251 from those aged 40-59. Those aged over 60 
give a much higher average value, at 0.334. HE/FE educated women aged over 60s 
provide the highest value, (SHA = 0.431, G2S2A3), and this is significantly higher than 
all eight of the groups aged under 59 (male/female × schooling dimensions × two age 
groups). The lowest value is given by the female, HE/FE educated, under 40 group 
(SHA = 0.152, G2S2A1) and this group is significant against three of the four over 60s 
groups (G1S1A3, G1S2A3, G2S1A3). 
 
As the preferences of the 12 population subgroups appears to differ, then the 
representativeness of the results becomes an issue. The subgroups within the existing 
sample of 559 individuals with full-data can be re-sampled in proportion to their 
population frequencies. These population frequencies are given in Table 12, and vary 
from a minimum of 10 (male, HE/FE educated, 60+) to a maximum of 89 (female, 
school educated, 18-40 year olds). A representative sample is typically younger, and 
less educated than our sample (which was selected for its spread rather than its 
representativeness).  
 
Table 12: Inferred representative sample (n = 559) 
Age Gender Education 
< 40 40-59 60+ 
Male School only 85 66 52 
 HE/FE 28 21 10 
Female School only 89 74 74 
 HE/FE 29 20 11 
 
The analysis selects the number required from each population group from the main 
sample and analysis proceeds as normal. Whilst our sample is unrepresentative in the 
pattern of respondents, the results are very similar to our earlier analyses. On none of 
the parameters does the difference between the original and representative samples 
approach significance. In general, the level of inequality aversion appears to be 
slightly higher (r = 6.75, 95% CI 6.19-7.32), as is the value of 100% health to a child 
(FHC = 1.875, 95%CI 1.817-1.933), the value of 25% health as an adult (SHA = 
0.272, 95% CI 0.248-295), and 25% health as a child (SHC = 0.509, 95% CI 0.458-
0.561). The condition cause/responsibility weights are also similar. 
 
5.5 The additional study  
 
The best-fit solution here suggests that 50% health is weighted as equivalent to 0.615 
of an adult healthy year – this suggests that the health between death and 50% health 
is worth 60% more ( 60.1/ 5.0385.05.0615.0 = ) than the health between 50% health and full 
health. The uncertainty in this figure is found through bootstrapping (n=200), and it 
appears that the value given to 50% health is significantly greater than 0.50 (95% CI, 
0.533-0.698). The additional study questions also investigate the value of full health 
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years at different time periods. In the main study, ill health occurs either in the first 8 
years or at the end of life, and the value of a full health year is split between the first 
18 years (youth) and subsequent life (adult). The main study suggests that (lifetime 
equity aside) each year of full health prior to 18 years of age is worth 1.828 times as 
much as a year spent as an adult, with this latter figure serving as a numéraire (FHA = 
1.000).  
 
Choice Set A2.3 considers ill-health between years 10 and 18; after 18 years of age, it 
is assumed that the parameters for adults apply. Between 10 and 18 years, the value 
that minimises squared utility errors over Choice Sets A1.3-A2.3 assumes that a year 
of full health whilst a child is worth 1.073 times as much a year of full health as an 
adult (95% CI: 0.928-1.218). That is, it appears that health after the age of 10 is 
viewed very much like health to an adult. The analysis varying the “adult” age cut-off 
to 10 years above found that this made very little difference to the values of the 
variables defining lifetime health (the AHYE). Therefore, whilst the level for 
inequality aversion may change as a result of changing the cut-off, the major results of 
the project are unaffected. 
 
Choice Set A2.4 considers ill-health between years 30 and 38, and was used to 
construct a weighting for the early period of adulthood (18 up to 40 years). For 
purposes of comparison, the numéraire period for health (FHA = 1.000) in which a 
year in full health equals 1 AHYE is now the period from 40 years onwards. Between 
18 and 40 years, the value that minimises errors over Choice Sets A1.3-A2.2 plus 2.4 
assumes that a year in full health is worth 0.989 AHYEs (95%CI: 0.888-1.091), with 
50% health worth 0.609 AHYEs (95%CI: 0.499-0.720). Again, this suggests that 
those aged 30-38 (or by extension 18-40) are not treated differently from “normal” 
adults. There does not appear to be a premium placed on helping adults during the 
period where productivity-based estimates would suggest special emphasis is placed 
on health. Both estimates suggest that where lifetime health differences over an entire 
lifetime are accounted for (using the inequality aversion parameter), the value of 
health appears to be relatively constant except for a period quite close to the 
beginning of life, and possibly within the first 10 years.  
 
The final choice set from the additional study used both 25% health and 50% health in 
the same question. The number of QALYs received in Choice Sets A1.3 and A3.1 are 
identical with the only difference being that Choice Set 3.1 uses 25% health for a 
longer period rather than 50% health for a shorter period. (The questions in Choice 
Set A3.1 are identical to Choice Set 2.1 in the main study.) The weight for SHA was 
selected here in order to solve for equality in utilities between the Thurstone-
equivalent and study state in Choice Set A3.1. The best-fit figure here suggests that 
the first 25% of health is worth 0.231 of a full health life year (95% CI 0.212-0.249). 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This project builds on the existing literature on the social value of a QALY. There is a 
growing literature exploring whether or not publicly funded health care systems 
should treat all QALYs as having the same social value, and whether there is 
empirical support for such policies (see Dolan et al, 2005 for a review). The purpose 
of this project was to develop this work further and to consider whether it is possible 
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to generate a set of equity weights for QALYs. This section is intended to provide a 
general discussion of the results from our studies.  
 
Following other research within health economics, we use a social welfare function 
(SWF) that allows trades-off between the lifetime health of different individuals. 
Since society may give different priorities to the health received at different ages and 
to different levels of severity, we consider social valuations over lifetime health and in 
relation to what we refer to as ‘adult healthy year equivalents’ (AHYEs) rather than in 
relation to ‘standard’ QALYs. In keeping with the conventional SWF framework, we 
focus on the valuation of outcomes rather than gains. We believe this focus on 
outcomes is preferable given its generalisability, as well as empirical concerns over 
the formation of reference points and violations of the Pareto principle (that is, from a 
given reference point, preferring to do less for both groups). 
 
To our knowledge, Nord et al (1999) was the only previous paper to have advocated 
social judgements over social valuations of health. There, social valuations were 
limited to the somewhat unrealistic case that society will value every year of life lived 
to all chronically ill or disabled individuals equally so long as the individual 
concerned would prefer this state to death. This assumption was made to address the 
conflation of social values with the measurement of individual health benefits in 
person trade-off data. We believe our methods and analyses are unique in estimating 
both the social valuation of lifetime health and the value given to more equal lifetime 
health together.  
 
The main findings of the study are summarised in Table 13. The timing of ill health 
seems to have a substantial impact. A greater weight was given to health experienced 
as a child in the main study (between ages 0-18 versus 18+), and the additional study 
suggesting that this might only apply within the first 10 years of life. We re-ran our 
main analysis to compare health in the first 10 years versus other timings (i.e. a 10 
year cut-off for “childhood”) and found no significant differences in our SWF 
parameters. This supports the use of a higher cost-per-QALY threshold for treatments 
that involve young patients. However, those interpreting the results of this study 
should refrain from extrapolating values in ranges that lie beyond the values used in 
the elicitation task. For example, in Choice Sets 2.1-2.4, where the impact of the 
timing of ill health is explored, none of the states involve a person dying before the 
age of 18.  
 
In relation to severity, 25% health was valued as worth 0.268 of full health, so that 
there was a slight premium in the first 25% of health (but not significantly more than 
the 0.25 weight given by the standard QALY). 50% health was valued as worth 0.615 
of full health, so that again there was a premium given to lower health states versus 
higher health states. Comparing 25% health and 50% health in the additional study, 
25% health was valued as worth 0.231 of full health, with the health between 25% and 
50% health therefore worth 0.384 (0.615-0.231). This suggests a slight premium for 
the health between 25% and 50% health. An indirect comparison across the main and 
additional studies suggests that the first 25% is worth 0.268, the next 25% is worth 
0.347 (0.615-0.268) and the final 50% is worth 0.385. 
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Table 13: Summary of results from Phases 2 and 3 
Baseline threshold of £20,000 for one year in full health as an adult (i.e. one AHYE) 
 
Issue Study Results Threshold per QALY change** 
M Significantly higher weight is 
given to health under 18 as 
compared to over 18. 
£36,560 for age < 18, 
£20,000 for age > 18* 
Timing of 
health 
A There is no significant difference 
in the weight given to 10-18 
years versus 18+ years, and no 
difference in the weight given to 
18-40 years versus 40+ years. 
£36,560 age < 10*,  
£21,460 age 10-18, 
£19,780 age 18-40 
£20,000 age > 40* 
M The first 25% of health is given 
more weight than predicted by 
the QALY but not significantly so 
£21,440 (4 years in 25% health) 
£19.520 (1.33 years from 25% to 
100%) 
A The first 50% of health is given 
significantly more weight than 
predicted by the QALY, with a 
premium between 25% and 50%. 
£18,480 (4 years in 25% health) 
£30,720 (4 years from 25% to 50%) 
£15,400 (2 years from 50% to 100%) 
Severity 
I Premium on 25%-50% health 
remains but is reduced when 
considering 50% estimate from 
additional study with 25% 
estimate in main study 
£21,440 (4 years in 25% health) 
£26,320 (4 years from 25% to 50%) 
£15,400 (2 years from 50% to 100%) 
 
Issue Results Threshold for health change (per 
AHYE) 
Inequality 
aversion 
Significant difference from the inequality 
neutral case (r = -1), where health is 
summed across individuals i.e. willingness 
to prioritise more equal outcomes. 
Not applicable.  However, 
thresholds can be calculated for 
differences between groups (e.g. 
social classes). 
Condition 
cause 
Significantly higher weight to NHS causes 
and significantly lower weight to partial 
patient lifestyle causes versus non-patient, 
non-NHS causes 
£18,340 per AHYE (partial patient 
cause) 
£24,520 per AHYE (NHS cause) 
£20,000 per AHYE (other causes) 
 
Main (M), Additional (A), Indirect from main and additional studies (I) 
* Fixed by assumption.  
** Timing changes assume moving an individual from 0% to 100% health, severity 
changes assume an improvement to adult health. 
 
There are, of course, some limitations to our research. The project has considered a 
very complex topic which is likely to have been challenging for many participants. 
Our study may have benefited from some qualitative study within Phases 2 and 3, and 
specifically a formal “think aloud” approach during piloting as compared to the 
informal feedback we received from interviewers. We would also have gained much 
in Phase 2 from recording the discussion groups but transcribing and analysing such 
data, as past experience has shown, is a particularly time-consuming activity. 
 
More generally, the questionnaire in Phases 2 and 3 required a balance between 
breadth of approach and triangulation. The issues raised by the study are complex and 
the main questionnaire required a lengthy book of prompts (74 pages) and interview 
script (53 pages). In an ideal world, our main SWF would be based on a larger 
number of choice sets and would consider different amounts of lifetime health. We 
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would ideally have liked more levels for our attributes, particularly in the severity 
dimension. However, this was not practical given the size of the questionnaire and our 
targeted sample size. Overall, we believe that our design balances respondent fatigue 
and comprehensiveness of our results as well as we could be expected of the project.  
 
So far as has been possible within time and resource constraints, we have addressed 
potential weaknesses in the methods within a series of sensitivity analyses (not all of 
which are reported here) and additional studies. Throughout, the results sections of 
this paper discuss the outcomes in terms of statistically significant differences in the 
key parameters. However, at a practical level, what actually matters is not necessarily 
whether the results are robust in that way, but whether the results would make a 
difference in terms of the incremental cost- effectiveness of an intervention. This is a 
complex issue that is beyond the aims of this project, and thus this paper does not 
address this. 
 
We did not consider an alternative form for the SWF but the CES form is widely used 
and largely accepted by economists. The results that generate the SWF should always 
be placed in the appropriate context; that is, in the context of macro level decisions. 
We look forward to all of our results contributing to on-going debate and health 
policy in relation to the relative societal value of health gains to different 
beneficiaries. 
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